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Issue 1/Mar 2017 
Have the Singapore Courts faltered in the enforcement of 
Arbitration agreements? 
TMT Co Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2017] SGHC 21 
DARIUS CHAN∗ 
In TMT Co Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2017] SGHC 21, the Singapore High Court 
took the view that an arbitration clause did not meet the prima facie standard to warrant a 
stay of court proceedings because it designated an inapplicable arbitral institution.  
Commentators have suggested that the decision is “surprising” and out of line with the 
prevailing judicial policy of upholding arbitration agreements.  This note takes the view that 
the ultimate decision is defensible because, on a proper interpretation of the dispute 
resolution clauses, there was no clear intention to arbitrate the dispute at hand. 
 
Facts  
TMT Co., Ltd (“TMT”), a Liberian ship-owning company, opened a trading account with the 
Royal Bank of Scotland plc (“RBS”) in May 2007. The trades were cleared by RBS through 
the London Clearing House, of which RBS was a Clearing Member. 
In 2010, TMT commenced proceedings against RBS in England for breach of the trading 
account agreement (referred to in the judgment as the “FFA Account Agreement”) 
negligence, breach of statutory duty concerning risk management and other obligations and 
negligent misrepresentation as to the margin requirements of the trading accounts. It was 
essentially alleged that incorrect information was provided by RBS and relied upon by TMT 
to make trading decisions, leading to substantial losses.  The FFA Account Agreement is 
governed by English law. Clauses 20 and 22 of the FFA Account Agreement provide as 
follows: 
20. Arbitration 
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Any dispute arising from or relating to these terms or any Contract made 
hereunder shall, unless resolved between us, be referred to arbitration under the 
arbitration rules of the relevant exchange or any other organization as the relevant 
exchange may direct and both parties agree to, such agreement not to be 
unreasonable [sic] withheld, before either of us resort to the jurisdiction of the 
Court.  
… 
22. … 
Subject to term 20 [the arbitration clause] above, disputes arising from these terms 
or from any Contract shall, for our benefit, be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
English courts to which both parties hereby irrevocably submit, provided however 
that we shall not be prevented from bringing an action in the courts of any other 
competent jurisdiction. 
In 2012, the parties entered into a settlement agreement to settle the English proceedings 
(referred to in the judgment as the “Settlement Agreement”).  The Settlement Agreement 
is governed by English law.  The Settlement Agreement contains an exclusive English 
jurisdiction clause. 
In 2015, TMT sued RBS’s Singapore branch and a number of RBS’s officers (collectively the 
“Defendants”) for losses arising from imposing improper and erroneous margin 
requirements, improper and erroneous valuation, diversion of monies and delay of 
instructions, wrongful or fraudulent assistance, and conspiracy to carry out the wrongful 
acts, relating to TMT’s margin trades.  
The Defendants applied for a stay of the Singapore proceedings and succeeded before an 
Assistant Registrar.  On appeal before the Singapore High Court, TMT argued, inter alia, 
that: 
(a) The Settlement Agreement covered only claims raised in the English proceedings. 
 
(b) The arbitration clause in the FFA Account Agreement was inoperative and incapable 
of being performed. There was no relevant exchange because the London Clearing 
House is not an exchange. 
 
(c) The arbitration rules governing the London Clearing House Clearing Members are 
inapplicable because they are intended solely for Clearing Members. TMT is a non-
clearing member. 
 
(d) Under the jurisdiction clause in the FFA Account Agreement, TMT must submit to 
the jurisdiction of the English courts if RBS commenced proceedings there.  
Otherwise, both parties are entitled to commence legal proceedings anywhere else. 
On the other hand, the Defendants raised various alternative arguments, including: 
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(a) Any dispute about the scope of the Settlement Agreement should be determined by 
the English courts pursuant to the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Settlement 
Agreement. 
 
(b) All the claims in the Singapore proceedings arise from or relate to the terms of the 
FFA Account Agreement, and would be subject to the arbitration clause under the 
FFA Account Agreement. 
 
(c) All the claims are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts under the 
FFA Account Agreement. 
 
Eventually, the Singapore High Court decided that the Singapore proceedings fell within the 
scope of the Settlement Agreement properly construed.  The Court also found that, even if 
there was any dispute about the scope of the Settlement Agreement, such a dispute would fall 
within the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Settlement Agreement.  The 
proceedings in Singapore should thus be stayed. 
By way of obiter, the Court proceeded to examine whether a stay would be warranted on the 
basis of the arbitration clause in the FFA Account Agreement.  The Court’s reasoning was 
that, because there is no relevant exchange in this case, the arbitration clause does not on its 
face apply to the present dispute.  On the evidence before the Court which appears to be 
undisputed, the trades that were executed under the FFA Account Agreement were carried 
out through a clearing house, which is different from an exchange. 
The Defendants tendered an English legal opinion which took the view that the English 
courts would not limit the arbitration clause to only situations where an exchange is 
involved.  The English courts would focus on the provision for arbitration, treating the rest of 
the clause as the relevant mechanism which could be modified to the situation at hand.  
The Court rejected the Defendants’ argument on the premise that the Courts would be slow 
to override the plain words in the parties’ agreement. The Court was unable to conclude on 
the evidence that there is any absurdity or that parties had intended to give an expanded 
meaning to the word “exchange”. The Court took the view that the threshold for granting a 
stay under section 6 of the International Arbitration Act was not met. 
Comments  
Observers have suggested the Court’s decision is “unusual” because the arbitration clause in 
this case was coherently drafted – the Singapore Courts have on previous occasions, such as 
HKL Group Co Ltd v Rizq International Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] SGHCR 5 and Insigma 
Technology Co Ltd v Alstom Technology Ltd [2009] SGCA 24, saved other defective 
arbitration agreements between commercial parties when the defect was more apparent. 
These observers have suggested one way of rationalising this decision: a bad arbitration 
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clause is more likely to be saved than one that is coherent but inapplicable, because the Court 
would be reluctant to “rewrite” the clause. 
In this writer’s view, the Court’s decision is defensible. The outcome of such cases does not 
simply turn on how well-drafted the clause is; a fundamental touchstone is whether the 
parties have evinced, prima facie, an intention to arbitrate the specific dispute at hand. On 
the facts of this case, the intention of the parties is gleaned by reading both the dispute 
resolution clauses in the FFA Account Agreement, ie clauses 20 (arbitration clause) and 22 
(jurisdiction clause), together.   
It is uncontroversial that, as a starting point, Singapore courts strive to uphold arbitration 
clauses—a paradigm example would be K.V.C. Rice Intertrade Co., Ltd v Asian Mineral 
Resources Pte Ltd [2017] SGHC 32, where the Singapore High Court recently enforced 
“bare” arbitration clauses which specified neither the seat or means of appointing 
arbitrators. However, unlike a typical case where the parties only included an arbitration 
clause but not a jurisdiction clause, in this case the dispute resolution mechanism included a 
jurisdiction clause. One would need to give effect to the existence and language of the 
jurisdiction clause.  
On a plain reading of clauses 20 and 22 of the FFA Account Agreement, it is arguable that, 
under the FFA Account Agreement: 
(a) Before parties “resorted to the jurisdiction” of the courts, parties would first submit 
disputes that are amenable for resolution “under the arbitration rules of the relevant 
exchange or any other organization as the relevant exchange may direct”; and   
 
(b) Any disputes not so amenable would then be resolved by way of the jurisdiction 
clause in clause 22. 
If the Defendants’ expansive interpretation of clause 20 were accepted, clause 22 may be 
rendered practically otiose.  There is no evidence that was the intention of the parties.  
Furthermore, that outcome would be inconsistent with the language of clause 20 because 
clause 20 itself refers to the possibility of parties “resort[ing] to the jurisdiction” of the 
courts. On its terms, clause 22 applies to any disputes that are not amenable for arbitration 
under clause 20. 
Put simply, it is arguable the scope of the arbitration agreement here is expressly limited to 
disputes that are amenable for resolution “under the arbitration rules of the relevant 
exchange or any other organisation as the relevant exchange may direct”. There appears to 
be no evidence, prima facie or otherwise, that the Singapore proceedings fell within that 
scope. 
The decision at hand is a good example of how, despite adopting a pro-arbitration policy, the 
Singapore courts will not enforce arbitration clauses indiscriminately. The mere existence of 
an arbitration clause does not, without more, carry the day. 
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